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**ACHIEVING THE OPERATIONAL END-STATE:
The Linkage of Military Operations with
Regional Strategy**

**A Monograph
by
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Armor**



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
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
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ABSTRACT

ACHIEVING THE OPERATIONAL END-STATE: THE LINKAGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS WITH REGIONAL STRATEGY by MAJ Christopher L. Baggott, USA, 52 pages.

This monograph discusses the linkage of military operations with defined regional strategy objectives designed to achieve conditions favorable to long-term U.S. interests. Most recent U.S. military endeavors may serve to show the existence of potential deficiencies in the successive linkage and logical evolution of the campaign plan from the point of crisis initiation through crisis resolution and culminating with the eventual restoration of conditions favorable to U.S. interests. This void may be as a result of campaign plan execution or a possible joint doctrinal defect in providing a mechanism to insure that both political considerations and civil-military operations are logically integrated into the campaign plan in order to achieve the desired regional strategic end-state.

The monograph will first examine the concept of "knowing your enemy" in terms of specific national characteristics through the use of classical theoretical examples. A description of current joint doctrine will clarify the necessity to link the campaign plan from the start of the crisis condition through post-conflict operations in order to achieve the desired conclusion (conditions favorable to U.S. interests). Utilized as current historical examples of both crisis action planning and deliberate planning are Operations "Urgent Fury" and "Just Cause," respectively. Each campaign will be examined to determine if the plan adequately addressed the requisite post-conflict actions in relation to the overall theater strategy. Success is defined by the realization of the specified operational end-state. Both campaigns will be evaluated to determine if they achieved the desired political and civil-military results. Evaluation criteria for campaign design in relation to post-conflict results are redeployment actions, civil-military operations, and security assistance. Finally, the monograph will discuss the operational planning implications of linking regional strategy with military force and provide recommendations to resolve identified problems.

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War is merely the continuation of policy by other means. . . . The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.

Carl Von Clausewitz: On War

For nations do not wage war for war's sake, but in pursuance of policy. The military objective should be governed by the political objective, subject to the basic condition that policy does not demand what is militarily—that, is practically impossible.

B.H. Liddell Hart: Strategy

I. INTRODUCTION

The classic bipolar world in which recent military strategy and operational art has thrived is no longer. The demise of the Soviet Union as a political and economic superpower has resulted in new international expectations and roles for the United States. The changing world order provides significant opportunities as well as potential dangers. Undoubtedly, the United States will be required to use one of five power instruments (political, military, economic, sociologic, and information) to secure, maintain or protect our national interests in other parts of the world. No longer can the translation of national policy in a obscure operational theater during a crisis situation be expected to be solved long-term through the exclusive use of military force. The ability to determine which specific power instrument (or combination) that will most efficiently achieve our delineated goals is the task of the National Command Authority (NCA), often regionally influenced by the military decision maker.

The Constitution of the United States grants the President both the authority and the responsibility to develop national policies, direct the national defense and safeguard national interests. The President, however, does not work in isolation. The NCA and other trusted presidential advisors, assist in the planning

and execution of both global and regional strategies.

Numerous legislative and executive organizations are involved in the formation of U.S. national security and the development of national strategy.³ The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) translate national security policy into military strategic guidance, direction, and objectives. Additionally, the JCS provides this strategic product to the appropriate regional Commander-in-Chief (CINC) responsible for the execution of a specified task. The CINC is entrusted with the dual obligation of linking unique cultural, religious and ideological characteristics of a nation-state to the theater campaign plan while protecting U.S. interests in a specified geographic area.

During peacetime over twenty governmental agencies are actively involved in defining regional strategies. Together they attempt to coordinate and develop policies focused on achieving a position favorable to U.S. long-term interests. However, there is no coordinating agency accountable for synchronizing this regional strategy effort. Routinely, during a crisis, the number of active participants is reduced. Once the decision has been made to introduce military power into the region, it becomes the principal duty of the responsible CINC to calculate the most efficient and practical means to apply this force.

The use of the military to resolve a regional crisis situation, however, may not be consistent with the concept of maintenance of long-term strategic interests. Force, in and of itself, may serve to eliminate the crisis symptom, but may not necessarily cure the prevailing cause. During a crisis, the regional strategic focus must remain clear in order to determine how the use of military force will best facilitate securing long-term U.S. interests. Military defeat of an adversary, in and of itself, may do little to solve the crisis long-term and may potentially

create further political obstacles. In fact, the initiation of the crisis resolution process may only be possible once hostilities have terminated. Failure to realize the importance of post-conflict operations may place the CINC in the unenviable position of 'winning the war but losing the peace.'

The theater campaign plan is designed to determine the most effective method to resolve a regional crisis in a manner advantageous to U.S. regional interests. Recent U.S. foreign military intervention examples may serve to indicate potential inadequacies in the successive linkage and logical evolution of the campaign plan from the point of crisis initiation through crisis resolution and culminating with the eventual restoration of conditions favorable to U.S. interests. The purpose of this monograph is to determine if a joint doctrinal or execution defect exists in providing a mechanism to ensure that political considerations and post-conflict military operations are logically integrated into the campaign plan in order to achieve the desired regional strategic end-state.

In the development of this paper I intend to cite specific U.S. contemporary historical instances of regional military contingency operations (one an example of crisis action procedures and the other of deliberate planning). A description of joint doctrine will serve to clarify the essential joint process participants and demonstrate the necessity to link the campaign plan from the genesis of the crisis through post-conflict operations in order to achieve the desired operational conclusion. Utilized as the most current U.S. examples of crisis action and deliberate planning are Operations "Urgent Fury" and "Just Cause," respectively. Each campaign will be examined to determine if the operational plan adequately addressed the requisite post-conflict actions in relation to the

overall theater strategy. Operational success is defined as the realization of the specified regional end-state. Both campaigns will be evaluated to ascertain if they achieved the desired post-conflict political and civil-military results. Simply put, the campaign analysis will determine if post-conflict operations were a planning consideration in the initial campaign design, and if the campaign plan estimated or implemented those actions required to achieve conditions favorable to U.S. interests in the region after the cessation of hostilities. Evaluation criteria for post-conflict operations are redeployment actions, civil-military operations, and security assistance. Finally, conclusions will be drawn from the analysis and recommendations provided.

JOINT THEORY

We accepted this war for an object—a worthy object—and the war will end when that object is attained. Under God I hope it will never end until that time.

Abraham Lincoln

War can be defined simply as organized violence between and within nation-states fashioned to achieve an objective. Whether the objective of a conflict is political, economical, or ideological is immaterial to the focus of this paper. Suffice it to say, that man has not progressed to an evolutionary level where nonviolent solutions have thoroughly replaced battle as the primary response to crisis. As early as 500 B.C., Sun Tzu wrote of the economic, political, and cultural implications of war and described an interdependent relationship between national strategy and military strategy.⁵ Although the technical character of war during Sun Tzu's period may be categorized as unsophisticated, its purpose is timeless. Specifically, military force principally utilized as a means to secure a favorable political end.

The prosecution of war is often considered obligatory for the protection and the defense of the state as a political entity and for the preservation and promotion of national self-interests. Typically, nation-states prefer peaceful coexistence and competition rather than combat to promote what they consider their vital interests. However, once these critical national interests are threatened, nations will use either the threat or the actual mechanism of war to protect them. In this respect, war and peace are not mutually exclusive principles, but rather, complementary functions. Each is a fundamental political means designed to achieve a desired end-state or objective. The use of war rather than peace to solve a political crisis is justified by the ends that it will achieve. In Strategy, B.H. Liddell Hart linked the concept of military objectives and governmental policies:

For nations do not wage war for war's sake, but in pursuance of policy. The military objective is only the means to a political end. Hence the military objective should be governed by the political objective, subject to the basic conditions that policy does not demand what is militarily--that, is practically--impossible.

Modern technology has changed the character of war. No longer is there such an event as a "campaign season." The contemporary battlefield is not restricted by weather, terrain, or limited visibility. Today, the conduct of war is both continuous and of high intensity. Although the characteristics of war may have changed, the purpose of war has not. A nation will commit itself to war or warlike acts over a broader spectrum of what it asserts to be provocations. Usually, the motivation to commit to war is in response to this provocation and interpreted as a threat.

War, limited struggles and peacetime competition are elements of the environment of governmental diplomacy. Each is utilized to secure a national objective or goal. The purpose of combat is to obtain

a position favorable in relation to the ultimate political end-state. This desired objective or end-state will best determine the most effective/efficient political power instrument employed.

The object of war is to attain a better peace. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire. If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after-effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace.

Civil policy conceives, administers, and concludes war. Once the objective of this policy is realized, continued combat is no longer required. Military strategy is the implied or threatened use of military force to impose policy and is secondary to national strategy.⁸ Military strategy translates national strategy into design and purpose for a theater of war. Military strategy derived from civil policy is the sole authoritative basis of all combat operations.⁹

It is this character of war as an instrument of policy that defines the environment of the military operational artist. To apply competently the elements of combat power into a region in crisis and hope to achieve optimal success, the military commander must be cognizant of the effects of local culture, ideology, history, and religion on the contemplated campaign plan. Arrival at the intended political end-state may not be possible if the employment of military force is situationally either too harsh or too lenient. In practice, war will be carried out to the degree of violence consistent with the politics motivating the opponents.¹⁰ The resulting predicament for the military operational practitioner (artist) is how to calculate this optimal military recipe for the employment of power.

EVOLUTION OF JOINT DOCTRINE

The complexities of the contemporary battlefield are such that it is neither practical nor prudent to

expect the head-of-state to execute the joint and combined character of war in a competent manner. The United States concluded this to be reality early in our history. In 1903, the creation of the Joint Board of the Army and Navy attempted to simplify existing structure and provide a system to organize the operations of the two services.¹¹ Prior to this, coordination between the Army and Navy had normally been accomplished by the President. To say that a harmonic or tranquil relationship between the two services was achieved by the signing of the 1903 proclamation would be a delusion. Relatively little was accomplished in the joint arena until after World War II. The intricacies of joint operations practiced to achieve a coordinated air, ground, and naval strategy in multiple theaters of conflict prove to be of such magnitude during World War II that the unification of the military departments under a single cabinet-level secretary became inevitable.¹²

The National Security Act of 1947 consolidated the military services under the Secretary of National Defense.¹³ The original concept, however, mandated a sharing of power between the secretaries of the military departments and the National Defense Department. The 1947 legislation not only created the position of National Defense Secretary and Joint Chiefs of Staff, it initiated an evolutionary process eventually resulting in the current joint command structure. It instituted the basis for modern joint structure and the formation of strategic direction. It required the JCS (in accordance with Presidential guidance) to establish unified (broad continuing mission and composed of forces from two or more military departments) and specified (broad continuing mission composed of forces from one military department) combatant commands to perform a unique functional or geographic military mission.¹⁴ Also, the 1947 Security Act stated that the

responsibility to assign forces to these combatant commands rests with the military services, and the responsibility for support and administration is assigned by the Secretary of Defense to a military department.¹⁵ Further revisions and refinements of military power distribution continued over the next few years.

In 1949, the Secretary of Defense was appointed as head of an executive department and assumed authority of the defense budget. Concurrently, the role of the military department heads was reduced.¹⁶ The Reorganization Act of 1958 further delineated the position and authority of the Secretary of Defense and defined the chain of command from the President and Secretary of Defense to the services.¹⁷ This refinement of joint purpose and mission process continued and concluded with the most recent Congressional action; the 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols) Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act.

The DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 was designed to provide additional joint guidance and to enhance the effectiveness of military operations. It complemented rather than invalidated the original intent of the 1947 National Security Act. It designated the Chairman of the Joint Staff (CJCS) as both the head of the JCS and the principal military advisor to the President. It further designated the CJCS responsible for the development of the strategic direction of the armed forces and required him to formulate both strategic and contingency military plans.¹⁸ Additionally, this legislation clarified the responsibilities and explicitly defined the joint military chain of command.

The 1986 legislation made unified and specified commanders responsible to the NCA for the execution of their assigned missions. This act defines the command authority of these commanders to:

- *give authoritative direction to subordinate commands, including all aspects of military operations, joint training and logistics;

- *exercise authority to select subordinate commanders and combatant command staff."

forces as required to accomplish his mission.²⁰ Further, the 1986 legislation specified the operational chain of command from the NCA to the CINC (Figure 1



The command chain between unified and specified commands is through the CJCS to the NCA. Of the ten command organizations shown, five (Atlantic Command, European Command, Pacific Command, Central Command and Southern Command) unified commands have a distinctive geographic orientation. These CINCs are assigned an area of operations by the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and are responsible for all joint operations within their designated areas. The remaining CINCs have worldwide functional responsibilities.²¹ Normally, during a crisis, function specific CINCs support geographic/regional CINCs. All CINCs, regardless if assigned a specific geographic area of responsibility (AOR), serve within the confines of national security policy and strategy. National security and military strategy delineates the purpose and provides strategic direction for each CINC.

National security strategy is defined by the NCA and "articulates US national security interests and presents a broad plan for achieving national objectives that support those interests."²² Simply put, national security strategy employs all possible instruments of national power during peace, crisis or war, in order to attain national objectives. U.S. strategic design during peacetime is to deter war, foster peaceful coexistence, and deter aggression. During war or crisis conditions, the aim of security strategy is to protect national interests and to create or return to an environment and conditions favorable to the nation.²³ Military strategy is derived from the national security strategy and is the basis for theater war planning.

CINCs translate national military and security strategy into theater unique concepts to meet war planning requirements and contingencies.²⁴ CINCs transpose strategic direction contained within national strategy into theater strategy and subsequent plans.²⁵

Through congressional legislation (1986-Goldwater-Nichols Act) the accountable CINC constructs both wartime and contingency operations plans devised to foster and protect U.S. interests abroad. Again, CINCs do not function in isolation. Theater operation and contingency plans must survive meticulous evaluations before securing final approval from the defense bureaucracy. Still, it is the responsibility of the CINC to develop theater military strategy complicated by the dynamic impact of nonmilitary regional characteristics.

When developing regional strategy, CINCs evaluate the theater environment and assess risks by comparing what has been allocated and what are the operational requirements. This assessment is not performed in isolation. U.S. diplomatic missions, governmental agencies, coalition and alliance members, and others participate in the strategic process. Needless to say, theater strategy is developed consistent and within the framework of both U.S. national policy and alliance agreements. The end product of this comprehensive and painstaking process is the formulation of a wide assortment of contingency plans designed to respond to all conceivable threats in a theater of operations.

CINC's develop theater strategies, campaign plans, and other plans in coordination with other supporting commanders, allies, and coalition members.²⁶ During peacetime, CINCs take action to deter and prepare for war by planning and organizing for war. Theater strategy is conceived based on guidance received from the JCS and NCA and the CINC's strategic intent. Theater strategic policy is derived from regional considerations, intelligence evaluation and other characteristics of the region.²⁷ From the genesis of the CINC's intent evolves the family of theater campaign and contingency plans. Once developed, theater campaign plans are further scrutinized and approved by the JCS and ultimately, the NCA.

A CINCs area of operations (AOR) is his assigned theater (specified as 'theater strategic direction'). In the event of crisis, the area of hostilities or theater of war may or may not include the entire AOR. The theater of war encompasses all land, sea, air and space directly involved in wartime operations.²⁸ When the theater of war does not include the entire AOR, CINCs may further organize or subdivide the theater of war into a theater of operations controlled by a subordinate commander. CINCs establish command relationships within the theater to enhance simplicity, ensure unity of effort, and facilitate coordination.

CINCs design campaigns to seek national or coalition strategic military objectives. The analysis of ends, ways, means, and acceptable risks guides CINCs as they organize forces and allocate resources.²⁹

All supporting commanders develop their own campaign plans to ensure operations, phasing and logistics support the CINC's campaign plan concept, phasing and priorities.³⁰ In this fashion, all activities and resources are coordinated and integrated within an AOR.

The strategic environment and condition varies with each theater, resulting with a wide range of possible threats to U.S. interests. Additionally, the extent of possible military, economic, and political operations required to counter each threat deviates in each theater. Current joint doctrine shows that operations are conducted within a continuum consisting of three general states; peacetime competition, conflict and war:

***Peacetime Competition.** Peacetime competition is a state wherein political, economic, informational, and military measures, short of combat operations or active support to warring parties, are employed to achieve national objectives.

***Conflict.** Conflict is an armed struggle or class between organized parties within a nation or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives.

***War.** War is sustained use of armed force between nations or organized groups within a nation involving regular and irregular forces in a series of connected battles and campaigns to achieve vital national objectives.³¹

Generally, each level of activity creates its own requisite measure of response by the accountable CINC. There are theater missions for war, conflict and peacetime competition. Peacekeeping operations and disaster relief may achieve the same relative merit and gains in relation to long-term benefits to U.S. interests as does the eradication of an adversary during war. The manipulation and use of power instruments, regardless of the level of conflict, are all designed to gain interests vital to the nation. Thus, the CINC's strategic estimate, anticipated operational concept, and campaign plan must be conceived to complement national influence, interests, and designed to accomplish the mission in the most efficient and effective manner possible. Joint contingency planning during peacetime is called deliberate planning and termed time-sensitive planning during crisis.³²

The deliberate planning process is a five-phase procedure that eventually leads to a fully coordinated family of plans. Phase 1 (Initiation) is the assignment of tasks and the identification of available resources³³. Phase 2 (Concept Development) is the collection and analysis of all factors that can significantly affect mission accomplishment, mission statement deduced, subordinate tasks derived, the best course of action determined, and the concept of operations is developed and documented.³⁴ The basic plan and supporting annexes are prepared in Phase 3 (Plan Development).³⁵ In Phase 4 (Plan Review) all elements of the operations plan are assessed and validated by the joint staff.³⁶ All required supporting plans are completed, documented and validated during Phase V (Supporting Plans).

The deliberate planning process is continuous, time consuming, and cyclic. Deliberate planning is designed to occur during peacetime to address possible contingency situations. It provides the Joint Planning

Community (JPC) a vehicle to generate and perfect war-time plans.³⁷ Deliberate planning is not necessarily designed to maintain a 'plan on the shelf' to be taken off during a crisis. It does provide, however, a foundation where future crisis planning may extend.

Time sensitive or crisis action planning generally evolves from a rapid and dynamic chain of events that may require the commitment of U.S. military forces or resources.³⁸ Crisis action planning procedures describe a six-phase sequence of events beginning with the recognition of a crisis and may result in the employment of U.S. military forces. Phase 1 (Situation Development) is little more than the realization and reporting of a crisis³⁹ Phase 2 (Assessment) results in the decision by the NCA to use military force to solve the crisis. Also, the diplomatic, military, economic, and political implications of the crisis are weighed.⁴⁰ In Phase 3 (Course of Action Development) CINCs are tasked (both supporting and supported) to develop and recommend feasible courses of action to resolve the crisis.⁴¹ Phase 4 (Course of Action Selection) is the selection by the NCA of a course of action.⁴² In Phase V (Execution Planning) a detailed plan is prepared to support the selected course of action.⁴³ Phase VI (Execution) is simply the decision by the NCA to deploy or employ U.S. forces.⁴⁴

The principle difference between deliberate and crisis planning procedures is associated with the factor of time. Generally, adequate time is available for both detail and coordination during the deliberate planning cycle. However, time is normally limited for detailed planning during crisis action planning. Due to the very nature of deliberate planning rationale, it is hoped that a complimentary operations plan (utilized as a base document) requiring few alterations is available to provide, at a minimum, essential information and data to help solve the crisis. Effective crisis

management may, however, be contingent on the competence of the CINC's joint staff to assimilate, integrate, and coordinate their actions.

The staff of a unified or specified command (or a subordinate joint component of these commands) which consists of significant elements of more than one services is defined as a joint staff.⁴⁵ A joint staff is constituted when service expertise is required to ensure that the commander fully comprehends procedures, potential and limitations of the member parts of the force assigned.⁴⁶ Each unified CINC designated a geographic area of responsibility is assigned a joint staff. Specific staff functions and capabilities vary from each unified command, but generally the joint staff organization has remained consistent. The typical joint staff organization consists of the personnel staff, the special staff, and the joint (or general) staff. The personal staff group is directly responsible to the CINC. It includes any assistants needed to direct matters requiring close personal control by the commander.⁴⁷ The principal functional divisions of the commander's staff are known as the joint staff. The function of the joint staff is to execute the responsibilities of the commander (i.e., developing policy, preparing and coordinating plans, etc.).⁴⁸ The special staff group assists the commander and the joint staff with distinctive technical, administrative or tactical matters. Generally, the special staff is composed of technical experts.⁴⁹

The combination of special, personal, and joint staff members provides the CINC the expertise to fully understand the tactics, techniques, capabilities and limitations of the component parts of the force.⁵⁰ Additionally, the joint staff supplies the requisite specialization so the CINC may fully comprehend the distinctive characteristics of the AOR. Typically, during a crisis the selection of an appropriate

military course of action that will best facilitate the attainment of long-term regional strategic goals is determined through this interaction and coordination of the joint staff with the CINC. The remainder of this paper will focus on two military contingency operations (Operations "Urgent Fury" and "Just Cause"); one operation conducted within the parameters of the crisis action process and the other an example of contingency operations conducted through deliberate planning.

GRENADA-OPERATION "URGENT FURY"

If ever a military operation typified the thought that war is an extension of policy, it was the 1983 U.S. invasion of the small Caribbean nation of Grenada. Located at the southernmost point of the Windward Islands in what used to be the British West Indies, Grenada is one of the least economically developed former British colonies in the region.⁵¹ Void of any mineral resources, the nation is primarily an agricultural economy with an average annual unemployment rate of nearly 40%. What Grenada lacks in economic significance is more than compensated by her strategic location. She is situated along the main shipping routes that carry Venezuelan oil to the U.S. Hostile aircraft or patrol boats based in Grenada could easily interdict Panama Canal traffic or disrupt more than half of the United States' imported petroleum.⁵² From a purely military and geographic strategic standpoint, Grenada, acting as a surrogate for either the Soviet Union or Cuba, could easily place the U.S. in a tedious political posture not unlike the situation that evolved during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

In an attempt to prepare the island for self-government and then independence, the British instituted a new constitution in 1951 that gave the island representative self-government.⁵³ On 7 February, 1974, Grenada became an independent state

within the British Commonwealth. The Grenadian labor activist, Sir Eric M. Gairy, involved in local politics since the late 1950s, became the first prime minister in 1974. Gairy's leadership, at best, was mediocre. His political strength was maintained only through his control of the police, his "Mongoose Gang" (Defense Force).⁵⁴ By 1979, the people of Grenada suffered immense unemployment, a huge trade deficit and an overwhelming national debt.⁵⁵

Over time, opposition political groups were able to exploit a discontented population. Gairy remained in power simply because the opposition was unable to produce a united opposition political front. In March 1973, London-educated attorney Maurice Bishop and college professor Bernard Coard, consolidated their urban Marxist political groups with a mass rural party, the Movement for Assembly of the Peoples (MAP) and the socialist Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education, and Liberation (JEWEL).⁵⁶ The resultant New JEWEL Movement (NJM) favored independence, nationalization of commerce, tourism, industry, land redistribution, and maintained a pronounced anti-American "nonaligned" foreign policy.⁵⁷ By 1979, Coard and Bishop had successfully manipulated and infiltrated the Grenadian political and police structure to such an extent that they effectively controlled the government. When Gairy departed the country on 12 March 1979 to visit the United Nations, Coard and Bishop orchestrated a bloodless coup and assumed control of the military and the government.⁵⁸

Within a relatively short period, the transformation of Grenada from a seemingly stable member of the British commonwealth to a Soviet/Cuban puppet began. The Cubans shipped small arms, mortars, rockets and ammunition (accompanied by Cuban military advisors) to the island's capital, St. George's. This initial Cuban effort was merely the beginning of what was soon to

become an almost daily Soviet or Soviet proxy supply effort culminating with the militarization of a previous nonmilitary society. By October 1983 (the month of the U.S. invasion) detachments from East Germany, Cuba, USSR Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Nicaragua, and Salvadoran rebels, had visited and had provided some form of assistance to the nation.⁵⁹ Despite the affiliation with the Soviets, what was to become most intolerable to U.S. interests in the region was the planned expansion of the Salines airstrip.

In May 1980, Coard signed a treaty with the Soviets that granted landing rights at Salines. In return, the Soviets planned to expand the length and size of the Salines airstrip. Once enlarged the airstrip would accommodate almost every type aircraft in either the Soviet or Cuban inventory. The strategic advantage that the airstrip gave the Soviets and Cuban was two-fold; one, Grenada could easily become a refueling stop for Cuban supply and personnel shipments to Angola and; two, the high probability of its use by either the Cubans or Soviets for strategic reconnaissance in the region.⁶⁰ Either use of the air-strip was unacceptable to the vital interests of the U.S.. The action placed the Reagan Administration in a strategic dilemma that required immediate resolution.

U.S. foreign policy during the latter stages of the Carter Administration and the early part of the Reagan presidency was far from successful. From 1979 to 1983 the U.S. suffered multiple international political setbacks. The fall of the Shah of Iran and the emergence of the Ayatollah Khomeini led to the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran with sixty-six U.S. prisoners held as hostages. The direct result of the Iranian crisis on U.S. foreign policy was near political paralysis and contributed to the eventual demise of the Carter administration while facilitating the presidential aspirations of Ronald Reagan. But,

even Reagan was not immune to political terrorism. Events in Grenada became just one more thorn in the side of an already troubled U.S. foreign policy.

By October, 1983, Coard was able to accumulate enough political and military support to seize power and overthrow Maurice Bishop. On 13 October, Bishop was stripped of all titles and placed under house arrest in St. George's.⁶¹ On 19 October, a crowd of loyal followers attacked and overwhelmed the small force guarding Bishop. Once liberated, Bishop and his entourage denounced Coard, dismissed the army commander, and called for a general rebellion against Coard and the ruling Central Committee. However, Bishop's freedom was short lived. In a matter of hours, Coard and his military reassumed control of the situation and executed Bishop and five NJM members on the spot.⁶²

The reaction to these events from neighboring Caribbean nations was both outrage and political condemnation. On 21 October the member nations of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) announced immediate economic and diplomatic sanctions against the military government of Grenada.⁶³ In this setting it was also decided to "seek the assistance of friendly countries to stabilize the situation and to establish a peacekeeping force."⁶⁴ Overt U.S. military involvement in the Grenadian crisis had begun.

The invitation by the OECS to the U.S. to solve the crisis, in and of itself, would not automatically entice U.S. participation. Military commitment to the region would necessitate that the crisis had some adverse affect on U.S. vital interests. Certainly, the events in Grenada since the political emergence of Coard and Bishop had impacted detrimentally on U.S. regional policy. Additionally, events involving U.S. citizens in other parts of the world (terrorist bombing of the marine barracks in Beirut on 23 October) provided an emotional justification for action.

Collectively, these current crises and the request by the OECS provided a credible reason to the world political community for U.S. military intervention. The window of opportunity to act dramatically in Grenada would exist only temporarily before events and world opinion made intervention a political impossibility.

Despite the OECS invitation, there were two principal arguments that led to the decision to intercede in the region; first, was the continued and massive military buildup of the island; and, second was the potential use of U.S. medical students and faculty members (St. George's University Medical School) as hostages by the Coard government.⁶⁶ President Reagan's address to the American public following the U.S. invasion on 25 October outlined his strategic purpose and intent:

Let me repeat: The United States objectives are clear--to protect our own citizens, to facilitate the evacuation of those who want to leave, and to help in the restoration of democratic institutions in Grenada.

Reagan's strategic objectives defined the mission of the military, the desired operational (not necessarily strategic) end-state, and were further transformed into a military concept of operations. In Grenada, it was the responsibility of the unified CINC (LANTCOM--Admiral Wesley McDonald) to translate strategic goals into military objectives and to develop a theater campaign plan. Although McDonald had regional responsibility for the island, he created an operational level command, Joint Task Force 120 (JTF 120--commanded by Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf) to plan and execute the Grenada. McDonald served as the theater commander, provided forces to execute the strategy and supervised the military execution of the operation. JTF 120 executed the military mission while McDonald clarified and implemented strategic guidance, supplied resources, and became the connection between political strategy and military operations.

The operational objectives of the invasion were to

protect and evacuate approximately 1000 U.S. citizens, neutralize the Grenadian and Cuban forces, and stabilize the internal situation so that a democratic government could be restored." The campaign plan was developed in short order by JTF 120 and the LANTCOM staff. Through rapid action, the U.S. led invasion force would liberate the island and the U.S. detainees and overwhelm the Grenadian/Cuban military. In accordance with the operational time table, by the third day of the incursion the major objectives were achieved except for some few Cuban and Grenadian troops who continued to resist. Little, however, was planned for after the cessation of hostilities. Post-conflict operations, from both a strategic and operational context, were conducted by exception rather than design.

POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS-GRENADA

Events in Grenada since the coup by Bishop and Coard in 1979 attracted the attention of the U.S. A marxist-socialist revolution in the Caribbean, in and of itself, will not necessarily signal U.S. military intervention. However, this perception changed once the U.S.S.R. and her allies became involved in the region. Now, Grenada was viewed by Washington as little more than a Cuban and Soviet satellite:

Well let me just interject right here. Grenada, that tiny little island-with Cuba at the west end of the Caribbean, Grenada at the east end-that tiny little island is building, or having built for it, on its soil and shores, a naval base, a superior air base, storage bases and facilities for the storage of munitions, barracks and training grounds for the military. I'm sure all of that..is simply to encourage the export of nutmeg.

President Ronald Reagan, 10 March 1983

Deliberation and strategy concerning the events in Grenada within the Reagan administration certainly began prior to Bishop's execution on 19 October. The State Department had initiated a review of the standard evacuation plan for Grenada and the JCS was asked to

review contingency evacuation plans on 14 October."⁶⁹ However, according to Langhorne Motley (The assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs) during testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, "October 19, the day that Prime Minister Bishop was murdered, marked the beginning of serious planning for the possibility that a non-permissive evacuation—one in which the host government impedes the departure of foreign citizens—would prove necessary."⁷⁰ By 20 October, LANTCOM had produced six different courses of action for an evacuation-type operation. Two of the plans imagined evacuation in a friendly environment, three in a hostile environment, and the last one was merely a show of force.⁷¹ The OECS invitation coupled with the 23 October marine massacre in Beirut added further political credibility to intercede militarily in the Grenadian crisis. On 25 October, Reagan sent the order to LANTCOM to begin operations. By 28 October the military offensive phase of the operation had all but been completed.

Once the military threat was eliminated and the Coard government overthrown, the U.S. government was left with the dilemma of what to do next. The aftermath of the U.S. invasion was a country without an effective governmental structure and an economy close to ruin. At least, the military expansion of the island by the Soviets and Cubans provided the people of Grenada jobs, money, and a future. It appeared that the U.S. invasion brought only short-term military gains and long-term Grenadian political and economic frustration.

Once the invasion was complete, the leaders of the Coard government were arrested, tried for the murder of Bishop and his colleagues, and sentenced. Complicating matters was the absence of a U.S. Ambassador (the regional ambassador resided in Barbados), a country-team structure, or a representative from the Department of State in the country. Effectively, there was no one

able to delineate U.S. foreign policy and bridge the political gap for the military planner. The only person left with any legitimate claim of authority was Governor General Sir Paul Scoon (Grenada's representative of Queen Elizabeth II).⁷² Almost immediately, Scoon took charge of what was left of the government.

On 3 November, the day after the U.S. marines had departed the island, Metcalf's TF 120 was abolished. Within two weeks after the initiation of hostilities, the bulk of U.S. forces had redeployed. Remaining in the country, was a small U.S. controlled peacekeeping force. As the last few U.S. forces gradually withdrew over the next few months, law and order was first handed over to the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force and eventually (three years later) to the Grenada Police Force.⁷³ Without a viable peacekeeping/police structure little could be accomplished politically or militarily. Without outside investors, be it either Soviet or American, economic recovery was at a standstill. The post-invasion government was void of legitimate leaders. At least with Coard, some embryonic political structure, though corrupt, was in existence. The redeployment of U.S. forces from the island was completed promptly (only a small stay behind force of U.S. military police remained) and seemingly with few significant problems. Unquestionably, TF 120 secured a tactical victory in Grenada. The slender line between political and military operations was clearly evident immediately following the invasion. The military's desire for force redeployment overshadowed their requirement as a stabilizing factor for the population. The campaign should not have ended until the post-conflict operation (Operation ISLAND BREEZE) was completed.

Grenada was in chaos after "Urgent Fury." Its economy had disintegrated, people were starving, buildings and roads were destroyed, thousands were out of work,

the government was impotent, and the task of restructuring society was fraught with problems of security, compounded by the hundreds of former Coard sympathizers still at large.⁷⁴ At least the assistance provided by the Cubans and Soviets provided the people of Grenada both employment and the hope for a brighter future.

Initially, the United States and Britain, among others, provided some financial assistance, equipment and civil-military training and support teams to the island. By all accounts, the U.S. forces that remained on the island in a civil-military role behaved and performed superbly. They allowed the Caribbean peacekeeping troops and police to join with them in restoring order and in maintaining peace.⁷⁵ They attempted to bring the situation back to normal by removing military equipment. Generally, they were polite and helpful to the people. Additionally, they coordinated and directed the training of the local law enforcement forces. The last of the remaining U.S. troops left the island in June 1985. Unfortunately for the people of Grenada, their mission was not completed.

Practical security assistance in Grenada necessitated an extensive program to rebuild the political, military and economic infrastructure. The U.S. prescription for Caribbean economic growth revolved around the tourist and service industries. This includes the opening up of regional economies to foreign investment and the creation of a market based economy. The appeal of the Caribbean work force to U.S. industry and manufacturing is its low overhead and production costs (particularly attractive in the case of Grenada, an English speaking nation). Untimely for the Grenadians was the dramatic rise in oil, manufacturing costs, an increasing fragile U.S. economy, and the declining terms of trade for exports during the mid to late 1980s. Also, inhibiting economic recovery was the mismanagement and corruption of the island's politicians.

As the political symbolism of Grenada has paled in the eyes of the U.S. public, so has its claim to special treatment. Increasing concerns over a vast budget deficit, and congressional legislation (Gramm-Rudman Act) requiring compulsory cuts in departmental staffs and resources, have collectively forced a reduction in subsidies to the country. From a financial assistance high point in 1984 of nearly \$60 million, the fiscal 1988 U.S. monetary contribution to Grenada was no more than \$7 million to Grenada.⁷⁶ Yet, the financial situation of the Grenadian people in 1990 is little better and in some aspects worse than it was prior to 23 October 1983.

The tasks facing the Grenadian government in 1991 are extensive. An unemployment rate of 40%, social tension, rapid increases in drug related crimes, high illiteracy, and a population where only 50% benefit from the luxury of electricity and running water are but a few of the monumental problems facing this country.⁷⁷ Continued fiscal restraints and difficulties in the U.S. reduce the chances of significant financial assistance. In the seven years after the invasion, the Grenadian people can detect few opportunities in their future. What remains is a nation-state that has return to political obscurity with little more than expectations for a future, yet ripe once again for possible insurrection or revolution.

PANAMA-OPERATION "JUST CAUSE"

Enough is enough!⁷⁸
President George Bush-17 December 1989

On 16 December 1989 First Lieutenant Robert Paz, a twenty-four year old U.S. marine, was shot and killed by General Manuel Noriega's 'Macho de Monte' (the macho men of the mountains) troops when attempting to evade a Panamanian military road block. On the same day, navy Lieutenant Adam J. Curtis and his wife were kidnapped,

beat and sexually harassed by other Noriega troops. These two incidents became the overt catalyst and political trigger for the commencement of the U.S. invasion of Panama. On 17 December, President Bush authorized military intervention and by 24 December the combat phase of the campaign plan would be largely concluded.

Operation "Just Cause" is an example of joint deliberate action planning. As early as February 1988, Panamanian contingency military operations planning had begun. The events described above were simply no more analogous than a green flag to signal the start of a race. Activities in Panama since the ascension of Noriega to military and political power had been the topic of concern to Americans for a number of years.

The country of Panama and the Panama Canal have both strategic and economic significance to the vital self-interests of the United States. As early as 1906, Theodore Roosevelt exhibited a clear understanding of these facts. "Of course, the Canal will be strategically important," he said, "We will use it against our enemies. Why else build it?"⁷⁹ In nearly every conflict since the construction of the Canal that the U.S. has participated in, it has served as a strategic asset. It has facilitated the rapid transfer of sea and land power between theaters of war and from coastal U.S. logistics sustainment bases. Not only does the Canal continue to furnish this strategic advantage today, Panama provides an essential military staging link (counter narcotics, counter insurgency, etc.) between the U.S. and other Latin American or Caribbean nations.

On 7 September 1977, President Carter and Panamanian General Omar Torrijos signed the Panama Canal Treaty, commencing a process under which the Canal would eventually be turned over to the Republic of Panama by 1999.⁸⁰ The transfer would occur gradually and be governed by a binational committee, the

Panama Canal Commission. Over the years it has been in the best interests of the U.S. to maintain a congenial affiliation with the people and government of Panama. The despot Noriega would change the character of this relationship.

Noriega's ascent to power began when he became the head of Panama's military intelligence directorate in 1970. In this position, he constructed a system of information collection and repression that made him a key figure in General Omar Torrijos' military government. After Torrijos' mysterious death in 1981, Noriega consolidated his power base and emerged as the military leader and political authority in the country.⁸¹

Noriega systematically placed devoted and trusted supporters in key governmental positions. He concentrated his military domination, asserted command of the National Guard (later renamed the Panama Defense Force-PDF) and, by 1984 controlled, through the military, all authority in the country. By 1987, Noriega dominated all facets of Panamanian life. In June 1987, Noriega's second-in-command, Colonel Roberto Diaz Herrera, accused Noriega of assassination, corruption, election-tampering and other crimes.⁸² The charges led to nationwide demonstrations and resulted in Noriega's declaration of a state of emergency. Noriega refused to retire as the commander of the Defense Forces when President Eric A. Delvalle insisted that he do so.⁸³ Despite the political overtures, power within Panama remained with Noriega.

In February 1988 Noriega was charged in Florida for drug trafficking and money laundering. The indictment declared that Noriega had used his position to obtain substantial personal profit by offering narcotics traffickers the safe use of Panama for the transshipment of cocaine to the U.S.⁸⁴ Further, the U.S. was irritated about increased Panamanian activity by the Soviets, Cubans and other East Block nations. When Delvalle

dismissed Noriega as head of the military on 25 February 1988, the pro-Noriega Panamanian National Assembly ousted Delvalle and installed Manuel Solis Palma as president.⁶⁵

The situation in the country was deteriorating rapidly. From February 1988 U.S. policy toward Panama would be governed by two principles: the unprecedented indictment of a previously friendly dictator and the continued official recognition of the president Noriega had removed as constitutional leader.⁶⁶ Economic and political sanctions were initiated by the U.S.. The Panamanian Constitution-directed elections of May 1989 were a travesty that resulted in an illicit political victory for Noriega and his followers. By June 1989 the Organization of American States (OAS) had collectively expressed distress concerning the conditions in Panama. By August the only two countries in the region providing any direct assistance to Noriega were Cuba and Nicaragua.⁶⁷

Analogous to the justification given by President Reagan for the Grenada invasion, President Bush contended that the current conditions in Panama were dysfunctional to the vital interests of the U.S.. The events leading to the decision to intervene militarily in Panama exhibit some resemblance to the events that led to the same earlier decision in Grenada (corrupt dictatorial regime, human rights violations, poor economic conditions, a heightened threat to U.S. citizens, etc.) However, unlike "Urgent Fury," military contingency plans were available for "Just Cause." Three principal military courses of action were provided to the NCA on 17 December 1989.

The most limited action characterized a surprise special operations force raid to capture Noriega using forces already available in Panama. Its advantage was low U.S. casualties and operational surprise. The disadvantage was a greater assumption of risk since no

one could be confident where to find the dictator. The second plan envisioned the use of all military forces already stationed within the country. This included both regular and special operations forces. Again, the advantage was the probability of low casualties and secrecy. The disadvantage was that with only limited U.S. strength it was reasonable to expect protracted military operations and a greater potential of collateral damage or destruction to the Canal. The third course of action planned the use of massive military force to eliminate the opposition quickly. This option guaranteed rapid operational success, and was ultimately selected by the President.⁸⁸

The strategic goals outlined by the NCA were to safeguard Panama's democracy by eliminating Noriega, establish and maintain law and order, successfully execute the Canal treaty, revitalize the economy, curtail drug trade, and gradually increase Panamanian governmental legitimacy and recognition by other Latin American nations.⁸⁹ Once Noriega was removed from military and governmental power, Panamanian political authority would transfer to the May 1989 opposition presidential candidate, Guillermo Endara. These strategic goals were translated by the unified commander (Southern Command-SOUTHCOM, GEN Maxwell Thurman) and the staff and units working for him into a family of related operational plans.

The operational plan sought to minimize both casualties and collateral damage. U.S. forces would strike simultaneously numerous operational targets on D-day (20 December 1989) to attain three operational objectives: one, to eliminate the Noriegan political and military regime; two, to isolate and force the surrender, or eliminate the PDF; and, three, to prevent Noriega's escape by sealing off the country.⁹⁰ The campaign plan, however, inadequately addressed operations to be conducted once hostilities concluded.

POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS-PANAMA

Redeployment of the majority of combat forces at the conclusion of the combat phase of "Just Cause," like "Urgent Fury," was almost instantaneous. The rapidity in transporting nearly 10,000 combatants from the U.S. to the combat zone in almost twenty-four hours occurred almost as quickly, but in reverse, during redeployment operations. Deployment and redeployment of forces for the U.S. military planners and practitioners has not surfaced as an extraordinary event. Operational and logistics planners have shown competency, as evident in the two campaigns studied, in this task. Yet, as was apparent during the campaign in Grenada, "Just Cause" operational planners generally considered civil-military and peacekeeping operations as a planning afterthought.

The deliberate planning process designed for future possible contingency operations in Panama began in 1988. Nation building, civil-military and civil affairs planning began in March after the JCS called for its inclusion in the first campaign plan ELABORATE MAZE. By the end of the year both the military force and post-combat phases of the plan were completed and approved by the JCS. The post-conflict operational plan, KRYSTAL BALL (Later renamed BLIND LOGIC, and PROMOTE LIBERTY after the invasion), assumed that selected civil affairs reserve units would be called to active duty prior to the initiation of hostilities in order to assist in directing the civil affairs, nation building, and psychological operations facets of the campaign." The initial campaign plan was modified and endured several revisions prior to its final acceptance by the NCA. The primary operational focus of the campaign plan was on rapidity of military actions and a nearly instantaneous return to peaceful coexistence with conditions favorable to U.S. interests. This

focus would remain consistent for all subsequent campaign planning."

Originally, the operational concept envisioned that elements of the 7th Infantry Division (7ID), the 5th Mechanized Infantry Division (5th MD), and the existing units stationed in Panama would execute the campaign. A Joint Task Force would be created (JTF Panama) and would exercise operational command of the forces in the field. By 1989, in concert with the existing operational design, elements (brigade) from the 7th ID and 5th MD (battalion) were conducting training exercises in the country. Further, both units received instruction in Panama specific civil-military and civil affairs details and familiarized with the cultural and national characteristics of the country. Also, a detachment of U.S. marines had been training in the area under Marine Force (MARFOR) control.

As events unfolded in 1989 and the situation in Panama continued to deteriorate it became more and more likely that some form of military contingency operation would be necessary. It was decided by the CINCSOUTH and coordinated through the JCS that the XVIII Airborne Corps instead of the originally planned U.S. Army South (USARSO) would become the JTF commander and staff (JTF-SOUTH). Almost immediately, the role of the 7th ID changed. Some of the missions initially assigned to the 7th ID were modified and given to the 82nd Airborne Division (ABN). However, available time only permitted the 82nd ABN to complete minimum civil-military and nation building training. The civil affairs mission would be performed by selected reserve component specialist (requiring NCA approval for military call-up) and one company assigned to the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Organic to the XVIII ABN Corps)." The original post-conflict operations plan, BLIND LOGIC was not used simply because the SOUTHCOM commander discounted it as ineffective just prior to the inva-


sion."⁴ When the NCA execution order for "Just Cause" was transmitted on 17 December there was essentially no approved post-conflict element in the campaign plan.

On 21 December, four days after the combat order was transmitted, the executive order to implement BLIND LOGIC was received. What followed was an extensive push by JTF-SOUTH and the SOUTHCOM J5 to generate and eventually implement a nation building plan. A provisional Civil Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF) was created by building out of existing structure (SOUTHCOM and JTF J5) an organization to conduct stability, security assistance, and nation building operations.⁵ Few, if any, of its members were familiar with the essential principles of nation building and peacekeeping. The CMOTF was responsible for civil military operations only, while civil affairs was handled by another temporary headquarters (Civil Affairs Task Force-CATF). Additionally, the 96th CA Battalion continued to function under the immediate control of JTF-South.⁶ In reality, there was no headquarters to coordinate or synchronize the activities of the three. By 26 December a selected call-up of civil affairs reserve specialists was approved by the NCA. For the first five days of the invasion only a handful of civil-affairs volunteer reservists and active duty experts were available to support the campaign.

Not only were post-conflict operations confused, its command structure was distorted. As the warfighting phase of the campaign was concluding by 26 December, combat units were transformed into peacekeepers and policemen. Rules of engagement changed nearly overnight. Confusion and uncertainty by combat forces of the process of converting from soldier to constabulary was the order of the day. By early January three different headquarters (CMOTF, CATF, SOUTHCOM J5) were involved in civil-military and peacekeeping operations.

The situation continued to deteriorate. By 8 January the SOUTHCOM commander, at the suggestion of the commander U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), ordered a merging of nation building activities under the control of the U.S. Military Support Group-Panama (USMSGPM) (Figure 2).” The USMSGPM would be placed under the operational control to the JTF-PM, which had been reactivated with the departure of the XVIII ABN and the deactivation of JTF-SOUTH.

As the USMSGPM gained momentum and personnel it assumed additional missions and eventually consolidated under its control all nation building, stability operations, law and order missions, psychological operations, and civil affairs actions in the theater. By February 1990 the USMSGPM increased from five to 1500 personnel. Unfortunately for the people of Panama, the injuries and collateral damage generated by soldiers untrained in peacekeeping operations had already occurred.



By mid-January, the rudimentary structure and plans for the USMSGPM had been completed and approved. The stability and civil military operation PROMOTE LIBERTY was designed to gradually replace the remaining military with a peacekeeping force." Ultimately, PROMOTE LIBERTY would establish civil-military interaction and a framework where the legitimate Panamanian government would restore the economy and democratic process (elections in 1994). Additionally, the USMSGPM, in conjunction with the U.S. Justice Department, initiated a police force training program where prior members of the PDF would assume the functions of civil police. Needless to say, the USMSGPM was not prepared or permitted under U.S. law to perform this training mission. Experts in law enforcement training have recently been brought into Panama to satisfy this requirement. Also, what exasperated U.S. forces was that the enemy of 21 December became the peacekeeper by mid-January. Not only was it difficult for the USMSGPM to assume this role, but previous PDF members changed instantaneously their mental orientation from soldier to constabulary force, many making the change reluctantly.

Developing and sustaining enduring mechanisms to enable a civil government to build or rebuild social, political, economical and human services is not a normal military mission. There are no defined tasks, conditions, and standards. The only U.S. military force in Panama capable or prepared to execute this mission were military policemen and specifically trained special operations personnel. However, by the third day of the campaign, nearly all of the U.S. combatants assumed this role. Since long-term stability in Panama was equated to the ability to successfully implement a progressive nation building strategy, the significance of this contingency mission during future potential operations for the responsible CINC is immense.

The determinant for stability in Panama after the invasion would be the success of the civil-military and nation building effort. The intent of the campaign plan was that these actions would follow combat operations. In effect, the campaign design was to proceed by pre-invasion, invasion, and post-conflict phases. Each phase would advance sequentially. In reality, the phases occurred concurrently. Operational planners concentrated almost exclusively on the attainment of the combat objective and little on stability operations and nation building operational branches and sequels. The eventual success of "Just Cause" may be judged on how well the U.S. directed the peace rather than the war.

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Both "Urgent Fury" and "Just Cause" must be regarded as military successes. Unquestionably, JTFs 120 and Panama accomplished their assigned combat missions with minimal problems. Both campaigns confirmed that the U.S. military institution, on relatively short notice, could assemble forces, deploy, engage hostile forces and redeploy. What these two campaigns did not demonstrate was either an expertise in planning or conducting post-conflict operations to advance the peace in a manner most favorable to U.S. long-term regional interests. This planning shortfall may be a result of an uncertainty in fixing responsibility. Is it the statesman or the soldier who plans the peace? Or, is there a dual obligation for this mission?

The movement of military forces to and from the combat zone, as was demonstrated during both campaigns studied, has proven not to be a significant problem for both operational and logistics planners. Redeployment actions as a component of post-conflict operations must be considered an operational strength. Nonetheless, civil-military and security assistance operations

proved to be inadequate. Characteristically, these two campaigns showed an American aversion to protracted conflict. Success, however, for most contingency operations must be nurtured. Operational military victory does not necessarily guarantee lasting regional strategic success. It is the responsibility of the CINC in conjunction with the appropriate governmental agencies to mold the military campaign triumph into a lasting regional strategic victory.

Since the correlation between military operations and political events is naturally ambiguous, warriors and statesman have tended to avoid the issue of linkage by operating in separate domains. At what point in time does the soldier hand the battle off to the politician? What is the synchronization mechanism of the campaign plan's post-conflict operation focus? Since current joint campaign planning doctrine is generally vague, execution becomes perplexing. To compound planning difficulties there is as of yet no approved single source document approved by the JCS as joint doctrine for campaign planning.

The military purist will challenge that there is neither a requirement nor need for the military practitioner to concern himself with anything other than combat. Unfortunately, this perspective is ill-advised in view of the contemporary role of U.S. military forces. More often than not, military rules of engagement will require soldiers to carry out these two ostensible paradoxical missions. One mission executed as a combatant, the other as peacemaker. The implication of civil-military and combat operations occurring concurrently rather than in sequence indicates that the individual soldier can often become both warrior and statesman. Tasks, conditions, and standards must be clearly defined and communicated by both the tactical and operational level commanders if this civil-military function is in fact one of the

anticipated mission during future contingencies. Unfortunately, there has yet to be published either a military doctrine or mission essential task list (METL) for these type operations. Yet, during "Just Cause" and "Urgent Fury," poorly prepared U.S. forces discharged a variety of civil-military, nation building, peace-keeping, and police functions.

The actual combat phase of each campaign lasted a relatively short amount of time. In just seventy-two hours the principal military objectives in both Grenada and Panama were achieved. Like deployment, redeployment actions for the bulk of the combatants transpired almost instantaneously. Post-conflict operations, however, would require significantly more time. In both cases, post-conflict planning was no more than an operational after thought, completed by exception rather than design. Yet, long-term theater strategic success was defined early on in both campaigns to be governmental stability and the creation of an environment favorable to U.S. national interests.

The campaign plan must traverse the broad span between military tactical action and strategy. The campaign plan is the basis for all other planning within a theater of operations or theater of war. Simply put, the campaign plan aligns operational means and ways to strategic ends or objectives:

A campaign plan translates strategic guidance into operational direction for subordinates. It is the commander's vision of prosecuting his portion of the war effort from the preparation phase through a sequence of military operations to a well defined conclusion which attains the strategic objective.

The difficulty that surfaced in the campaign plan evolution of Operations "Urgent Fury" and "Just Cause" was not the planning of military (operational and tactical) operations but the sequencing of post-conflict procedures (i.e., well defined conclusion which attains the strategic objective). The answers may simply be found through an estimate of planning responsibilities.

An adaptation of the Gorman model (see Figure 3) shows a dependent relationship between crisis intensification and the application of military power.¹⁰⁰ The model, in and of itself, may be an oversimplification of the crisis environment. Yet, it does clearly show the existence of potential crisis planning weaknesses. As the scale of the crisis expands from peacetime competition, conflict and war, the requirement for military force to resolve the crisis increases proportionately. The actual employment of military forces in support of other elements of national power in a region is situationally dependent on the effect of the crisis on our vital strategic interests. Regional or national conflicts that have little effect on our strategic interests will not necessitate U.S. military intervention. On the other hand, war in the Persian Gulf or Venezuela will constitute a threat to U.S. vital interests and may likely result in U.S. military force to solve the crisis.




FIGURE 3

Peacetime competition is considered to be at the lowest level of possible conflict between nations. Generally, the political, economic, and informational elements of national power function unobstructed and without the need of the military element. Numerous U.S. agencies and staffs (Departments of State and Defense included) operate within this environment. Once a crisis develops and increases in intensity to the point that U.S. military intervention is considered, the campaign planning process is initiated.

Hopefully during an emergency through the "Deliberate Planning Process" most operational contingencies will have been addressed and all that will be required is to fit the situation to the model plan. At worst case during time-sensitive circumstances when no plan currently exists "Crisis Action Procedures" will provide a systematic approach to rapidly assimilate information and produce an integrated campaign plan. But, as was evident in the two operations studied, campaign planning and execution generally stopped at the point of cessation of hostilities and redeployment. Nation building, peace keeping and civil-military operations become the joint responsibility of the military practitioner, diplomats, and other government representatives. Thus, crisis evolution originates and concludes with peaceful competition chiefly controlled by governmental agencies other than the Defense Department (DOD).

As the potential for military employment increase, operational control of the region is assumed by the DOD. Once the crisis is concluded (a reverse "Gorman" model) control reverts back to non-military agencies.¹⁰¹ It is at this point of "battle hand-off" between governmental agencies where coordination of effort is most susceptible to failure.




FIGURE 4

2.

Missing from joint doctrine is a mechanism or an agency to ensure synchronization of the campaign plan through the operational continuum (peacetime competition, conflict, war and back to peace). Although CINCs translate national strategic tasks and objectives into an operational campaign plan, they normally define success in military terms and not in relation to the desired regional economic, political, and social end-state. Yet, it is the successful conduct of operations at the point between peace and war where long-term stability and conditions favorable to U.S. interests reside. The CINC responsible for a specific AOR must ensure that the application of military power serves both national policy and strategy and is coordinated within the social, political, and economic reality of the region in crisis. Additionally, the CINC must communicate his concept on the application of all national power elements and plan military operations in

either peace, crisis or war to correspond with overall national strategy. Unfortunately, the current joint staff structure may not facilitate a planning connection between the use of military power and the distinctive characteristics of the region in conflict.

The CINC is assigned a political advisor (POLAD) on his personal staff. The POLAD is an expert on the specific cultural, ideological, religious and national characteristics of the AOR. By design, the POLAD provides to the CINC the requisite knowledge of the political, economic and social character of the region. In addition to the POLAD, the CINC has available numerous governmental departments (i.e. diplomats, D.O.S, country teams, security assistance forces) fully capable to assist him in assessing the implications of the non-military features of the AOR on a contingency plan. However, the role of the POLAD during crisis planning as outlined in current joint doctrine is vague.

The POLAD is generally not an active participant in campaign development. The J5 is responsible for campaign plan preparation. By design, there is no single authority assigned to the J5 staff cognizant of the implications of the plan in relation to the characteristics of the nation in crisis. Generally, what transpires is that once the campaign plan is written in draft form it will be studied by the other members of the CINC's staff. If the proposed plan is unacceptable in terms of the effects of the non-military aspects of the country, the POLAD can express this point by not concurring with the plan. This may work well when sufficient planning time is available during the Deliberate Planning Process. However, when time is restricted during Crisis Action Planning, the reality of the staff coordination process may place the CINC in a position to recommend a plan to the NCA that may not fully comprehend its possible long term effects

to the country and region in crisis.

The POLAD must be involved in the campaign planning process from the genesis of the crisis. Either the POLAD must coordinate and operate directly with the J5, or a member of the J5's staff should be completely cognizant of the consequences of planning strategies. Under the current JTF and CINC command and staff structure, time consumed by the POLAD in campaign plan development is time unavailable for his principle duties. More practical and, perhaps, efficient is the augmentation or permanent assignment of personnel with the requisite AOR knowledge into the J5 staff.

CONCLUSIONS

Contingency operations in either a low, mid, or high intensity environment will be, more likely than not, the probable role of U.S. military forces in the foreseeable future. The significance of both the regional and national non-military characteristics of the area in crisis will certainly effect the development of feasible operational courses of action. The application of military strength to resolve a crisis must be incorporated into the regional strategy in order to achieve long-term success. The campaign design doctrine must require a theater assessment, consideration of the desired end-state, their relations to civil and military conditions, and the resulting military campaign objectives.

Operations "Just Cause" and "Urgent Fury" demonstrate a historical preference by U.S. operational planners to sequentially phase the campaign design into components. Deployment of combat forces, combat, peacekeeping, redeployment and nation building frequently illustrates the typical campaign plan progression. Clearly, as demonstrated in both campaigns studied, these operational components must be accomplished simultaneous rather than in succession.

During a crisis, politicians and soldiers weigh both the costs and risks of possible courses of action. However in weighing them against the prospects of war, most politicians will base their evaluations on the war plans prepared by the military experts and on the estimated losses and chances of success anticipated in these plans.¹⁰² As the most current U.S. historical examples have shown, military plans tend to cover only those actions required to secure a military victory.

Operational planners must consider the possible effects of all non-military power instruments in the campaign plan design. The use of military force to solve a regional crisis, in and of itself, may only compound the existing problem and create a greater negative effect on long-term national interests. The campaign plan must progress beyond the point of combat resolution to the point of the creation of conditions favorable to U.S. vital interests.

Both "Urgent Fury" and "Just Cause" indicate that in a relatively short amount of time combat forces can be transformed into peacekeepers. The significance of this reality is immense. Rules of engagement may change over night. Certainly, this confused the combat troops in both Panama and Grenada.

The responsibility for the transition from peace to war and back to peace involves both the statesman and soldier. Currently, there is no regional governmental or organizational mechanism to synchronize the actions of the two. Competing demands and priorities within each governmental bureaucracy often results in the preference for a parochial resolution strategy that may conflict with the best available collective course of action.

Unquestionably, the contemporary role of the U.S. in world affairs has changed how our military views itself. Military objectives are interactive and functional steps in the achievement of political

objectives. Military operations planned in isolation and without regard to regional political realities may inevitable result in only transitory tactical military success and, in fact, create more significant problems over time.

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(91) Interview with Dr. Larry Yates (Combat Studies Institute (CSI), Ft. Leavenworth, Ks.), 1 March 91. Dr. Yates is the CSI primary historian and analyst on Operation "Just Cause." He was in Panama during the invasion and has compiled all campaign data relevant to post-conflict actions.

(92) Interview with LTC Douglas Brisson (G5, 82nd ABN during "Just Cause"), 21 March 1991. LTC Brisson stated that the operational design was to transition to war and back to peace as quickly as possible. In this manner, it was hoped that the campaign would have minimal effect on the populace.

(93) Interview with COL Michael Peters (Commander 96th CA Battalion during "Just Cause"), 20 March 1991. COL Peters stated that one company of the 96th CA Battalion was tasked with the responsibility to execute the "Just Cause" civil affairs mission. The company deployed with the 1st Ranger Battalion and was one of the first external combat units to move into the theater. However, as the mission increased in magnitude, the entire battalion eventually deploy to the region.

(94) Interview, Dr. Larry Yates, 1 March 1991.

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(96) Interview, COL Michael Peters, 20 March 1991.

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